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Introduction
One of the major elements of the Christian teaching is the affirmation that the 
world was created by God out of nothing. The Fathers of the Church attempted for 
centuries to elucidate the sense of this dogma in philosophical terms, in particular by 
dealing with the temporal dimension of creatio ex nihilo. On the one hand the creation 
of the world is represented through the unfolding changes of the world, on the other 
hand such a thinking is problematic, because the very representation of creation out of 
nothing takes place in the already existing form of created subjectivity. Thus, as it was 
asserted before, any representation of creation in the natural attitude is problematic 
(Nesteruk, 2014; 2015: 414–416). Indeed Christian cosmology, having been imbued 
with the Greek philosophy originating from pre-Christian times, had inherited the 
picture of the physical world based in the Aristotelean philosophy and Ptolemy’s (2nd 
century BC) astronomy in which the cosmos was presented by a system of the heavenly 
spheres, bearing the moon, five planets and the sun, rotating around their geometrical 
and ontological, immovable centre with the earth. The cosmos was finite and concluded 
by the sphere of immovable stars, a “boundary of the universe”, beyond which was a 
mysterious nowhere. Saying differently, the cosmos of Christians, in spite of not being 
their home (St Augustine), was an object of a passive contemplation, sometimes detached 
from its perception as a good creation by good God. At the same time the Fathers of 
the Church were not concerned too much with knowledge of the world per se and 
cosmos did not have the same importance for them as it was for the pagan philosophers. 
Correspondingly, when one invokes the term “cosmology”, “cosmos”, “cosmic vision”, 
“Christocentric cosmology” etc., reflecting the often claimed “cosmic dimension” of 
Patristic theology, these cosmic connotations are not those which were meant by the 
ancient Greek philosophers (and certainly not by modern physical cosmology). One 
could suggest, hypothetically, that the Fathers could have been interested in reconciling 
the ancient Greek cosmology with that of the Genesis of the Bible (which does not 
have any indication of the spherically structured universe). One can add to this that 
the perception of the finitude of the spatial dimensions of the natural world following 
from Ptolemaic cosmology must have been complemented by the perception of the 
finitude in duration of the world that followed from Biblical teaching. However, this 
cosmographic, or, so to speak, natural finitude was inherent in Fathers’ thought not 
only because of astronomical ideas and Biblical tradition; for them space and time were 
finite first of all on the grounds of their epistemological understanding as expressions 
of finitude and limitations in general. For example, temporality is a characteristic 
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of the finite creation related to all things. According to Maximus the Confessor, for 
example, “…everything is certainly in time, since everything that possesses existence 
after God possesses this existence in a certain way and not simply. And therefore they 
are not without beginning. For if we know how something is, we may know that it is, 
but not that it [always] was.”1 Here is the motive of creation is present: the universe 
cannot be infinite in time and space because it was created out of nothing, so that its 
hypothetical infinitude would contradict its created nature. In this sense the notions of 
infinite space and endless time are contradictory as being a mixture of that which is 
supposed be uncreated (the infinite) and created (which is always given in rubrics of 
limited spatiality and limited movement (temporality)).
However this part of cosmology of the Fathers, as being concerned with the 
visible creation did not deal with the issue of creation out of nothing proper. The 
major problem was the explication of the sense of creatio ex nihilo in philosophical 
and theological terms. Most of the Fathers, Maximus the Confessor, for example, 
attempted to represent creation through its constitution, for example, as the distinction 
and difference (diaphora) between the visible and invisible (sensible and intelligible) 
realm in creation. Such a cosmology is realistic in the sense that it does not enquire into 
the conditions of the possibility of the constitution the world by the human subject. In 
other words, the natural attitude2 is used in speaking about creation. But this approach 
is fundamentally problematic for one cannot position “creation of the world” outwardly 
as if the enquiring consciousness would be positioned outside creation. Expressing the 
same idea differently, the problem is to attempt to find a pre-existing ontological context 
in which creation would be a sort of an anticipated effect. Such a context does not 
exist outside creation that entails that ontological categories do not suit any description 
of creation out of nothing. Classical metaphysical context and ontology thus must be 
abandoned, abandoning together with it the natural attitude and any representation 
1 Maximus the Confessor, Ambigua 10, PG 91, 1180 C-D [This ET: (Louth, 1996: 139)].
2 The natural attitude is related to the activity of consciousness and, according to M. Natanson: “Within the 
natural attitude I act in a world which is real, a world that existed before I was born and which I think will 
continue to exist after I die. This world is inhabited not only by me, but also by my fellow men, who are hu-
man beings with whom I can and do communicate meaningfully. This world has familiar features which have 
been systematically described through the genetic-causal categories of science. The world of daily life is lived 
within this natural attitude, and as long as things go along smoothly and reasonably well, there arises no need 
to call this attitude into question.” The reasonability and wellness is related to the situation when the question 
about the contingent facticity of that which is going on around, including the facticity of the whole world and 
the “I”, which makes enquiries about it, does not arise. Then Natanson continues: “But even if I do occasionally 
ask whether some things “really real”, whether the world is “really” as it appears to be, these questions are still 
posed in such a way that they are my questions about the natural world in which I live. I do not really scrutinize 
my natural attitude in any rigorous manner: I merely mark off a bit of it for more careful study” (Natanson, 
1959: 232). 
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of creation out of nothing in the phenomenality of objects. As we will see below the 
situation is similar to the futility of describing the event of birth of man in the limits 
of ontology or phenomenality of objects. In the same way as life through its coming 
into existence is accepted in theology as that primary givenness in the human Divine 
image which cannot be denied, creation cannot be denied, it cannot be bracketed (as 
the bracketing of the world) and thus cannot acquire the phenomenality of objects.1 
Saying differently, one cannot approach the issue of creation in the phenomenality of 
objects which requires the pre-existent temporal context.
Indeed, it is intuitively clear that creation is a unique happening which exceeds 
any anticipation in terms of quantity, quality, modality and relation. As was argued 
elsewhere one can speak of creation as a saturated phenomenon (Nesteruk, 2015: 403–
474), implying that the only plausible way of treatment of creation out of nothing is to 
consider it in the phenomenality of events. The philosophers of antiquity and Church 
Fathers anticipated this predicament of dealing with creation and attempted to tackle it 
by using those philosophical means which have been available to them. Can these means 
be interpreted in a new way in order to give a more articulate explication of the thesis 
that creation out of nothing escapes ontological description and represents an event-
like phenomenon, saturating intuition by its content and linking its phenomenality to 
that one of the self-affectivity of life, experiencing itself from itself, that is being the 
revelation of life to itself that is the revelation of God? In order deal with such questions 
we consider one of the remarkable arguments used by the Church Fathers in order to 
affirm the truth of creation out of nothing (escaping any anticipatory context) that was 
developed in the course of the opposition to the idea of creation based on the argument 
known under the name of “Why not sooner?”2
If creation of the world did take place in the finite past of the world, assuming 
that one can have either a theological or physical estimate of its age, the argument 
against such an assertion runs as follows: why did the world was created not before 
or later than those thousands of years which were allocated to the age of the world 
on the basis of the Bible reading (billions of years in modern scientific terms, on the 
1 It is the inseparability of the universe and a subject, observing it from within that makes the cosmological idea 
(that is the idea of totality of the world) fundamentally different among other ideas of reason, such as the idea 
of soul or the idea of God. Kant wrote that neither psychological nor theological idea entail contradiction and 
contain antinomies (Kant, A673/B701, 1933: 552). Practically this means that one can easily deny the existence 
of a soul (let us say, on materialistic grounds) or deny the existence of God (on atheistic grounds). However it 
is impossible to deny the existence of the universe for it would deny the empirical world of sense which is part 
of the universe and which contains the foundation of all knowledge about universe.
2 See a comprehensive review in (Sorabji, 1983: 232–238). 
– 1608 –
Alexei V. Nesteruk, Tatiana V. Litvin. The Phenomenological Interpretation of Creation of the World out of Nothing…
basis of cosmological observations). As we will see below, the strong refutation of this 
argument was based on a philosophical observation that it was no time before creation, 
so that the question “Why not sooner?” does not have any sense if it is treated in terms 
of temporal sequences. Another line of argument was strictly theological and appealed 
to the incomprehensible nature of God, whose volition of creation is beyond human 
wisdom. What is interesting from our point of view is that all assertions on creatio 
ex nihilo, with the impossibility to position it as some happening in terms of time and 
space, de facto, refute, in a modern language, the employment of the natural attitude, or 
phenomenality of objects for tackling the issue. This brings an opportunity to elucidate 
and may be develop a view of the creation out of nothing in the phenomenology of 
events, treating creatio ex nihilo as an event of the impossible, beyond quantification 
and qualitative definition, beyond modality and relationality, the inaugural event 
donating thus an unpredictable and unforeseeable future to the universe. The defence 
of the idea of creation by the ancient philosophers and the Fathers, being treated 
phenomenologically, represents an interest for phenomenology of events, as well as for 
theology, mutually fertilising each other and elucidating further the human capacity of 
dealing with such saturated phenomena as creatio ex nihilo. 
Creatio ex nihilo in Patristic Thought:  
Reification by Augustine and Maximus the Confessor
There is no need to repeat at length about Christian teaching on creation of 
the world created God out of nothing. Basil the Great, in his Hexaemeron made a 
distinction between creation of the intelligible world with no temporal flux and no 
spatial dimension, and the creation of the visible universe together with “the succession 
of time, for ever passing on and passing away and never stopping in its course” (Basil 
the Great, I:5, 1994: 54). Basil asserts that the meaning of the Biblical phrase “In the 
beginning God created” must be understood as “in the beginning of time” (Basil the 
Great, I:5, 1994: 55), that is God created the visible world together with time, and it 
was the beginning of time in the visible world1. In order to articulate the a-temporal 
nature of “the beginning of the world”, and to remove any causation at the beginning 
in terms of time-series, Basil affirms that “the beginning, in effect, is indivisible and 
instantaneous...the beginning of time is not yet time and not even the least particle of 
it” (Basil the Great, I:5, 1994: 55). Augustine in Confessions, XI addressed the problem 
1 In a different passage Basil argues that the creation of the world was not a spontaneous origination, i.e. concep-
tion by chance, but, on the contrary, it was created with a purpose an reason. See (Op. cit., I:6: 55).
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of the origin of time directly, affirming similarly to Basil, that: “The way, God, in 
which you made heaven and earth was not that you made them either in heaven or on 
earth... Nor did you make the universe within the framework of the universe. There 
was nowhere for it to be made before it was brought into existence”1; the universe 
was not created by God in time, but was created with time2. Augustine affirmed the 
creation of the universe and time within it as the only consistent expression of the 
Christian affirmation of creatio ex nihilo. The nihilo could not be something, it could 
not have any attributes of created things, it must be an absolute philosophical no-thing.
Maximus the Confessor, following his predecessors, repeats that the world was 
created out of nothing because of God’s will and goodness, by his Wisdom and Logos. 
The createdness of the word implies its non-eternity and consequently its beginning 
in time. However, in spite of that the beginning in time can be understood only from 
within the already created (according to Augustine this cannot be a “beginning” as if 
it would be seen outside the world), Maximus points to a difficulty that can arise. One 
reads a passage from his Centuries on Charity 4.3: “God, who is eternally Creator, 
creates when He wills by His consubstantial Word and Spirit, because of His infinite 
goodness.” This is a general statement which does not raise any questions because 
this is a matter of religious conviction. Then Maximus anticipates a possible question 
on details of this creation of the world: “Nor must you object: Why did He create at a 
certain time since He was always good?” Here the question is formulated from within 
those categories of sequence and time which pertain to the already created world. 
Indeed, if the creation of the world happened several thousand years ago measured 
by the created time, why this age of the world is such as it is; in other words, can we 
enquire into the nature of this age’s contingent facticity as it is contemplated from 
within creation? Maximus gives a characteristic response – “no”: “The unsearchable 
wisdom of the infinite essence does not fall under human knowledge.”3 It is impossible 
to transcend the boundaries of the created and to enquire into its facticity on the 
grounds of the impossibility of knowing the divine volitions and intentions; creation 
with its scecific and contingent features remains a divine mystery connected with the 
divine providence.
Here it is interesting to note that Augustine was essentially concerned with the 
same question as Maximus later. In his Confessions, Augustine, enquired, from the 
1 Augustine, Confessions, Book XI:5. [This ET: (Chadwick, 1991: 225)].
2 Augustine, City of God, XI:6.
3 This ET: Sherwood P., St. Maximus the Confessor. The Ascetic Life. The Four Centuries on Charity (London: 
Longmans, 1955), p. 192.
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name of an anonymous converser, on why creation is not eternal: “But if it was God’s 
everlasting will that the created order exist, why is not the creation also everlasting?”1 
One can grasp that this question of Augustine is equivalent to the question of Maximus 
the Confessor on why creation now and not later by appealing to another text of 
Augustine from “The City of God” where he discusses another question on why the 
first creation of man happened later than before. Augustine reacts to the question “why 
an infinity of ages passed without man’s being created, why his creation was so late 
that less that six thousands years, according to scriptural evidence, have passed since 
he first came into existence” by making a reference that any finite period of created 
time, be it six thousands or six millions years is incommensurable with the Divine 
eternity, and thus the questions as to why now, that is late, and not before, has no sense 
in the perspective of eternity. Augustine reduces this question to the problem of the 
contingent facticity of creation of man in general: “Therefore the question which we 
now ask after five thousands years or more, posterity could as well as, with the same 
curiosity, after six hundred thousand years, if the mortal state of humanity, with its 
succession of birth and death, should last so long… In fact the first man himself might 
have asked, on the day after he was made, or even on the very day of its creation, why 
ha had not been made sooner. And whenever he had been made, no matter how much 
earlier, this objection about the beginning of temporal things would have had precisely 
the same force then as now-or at any time”2
In modern context the passage quoted above is interesting by that that it explicates 
the problem of the phenomenological concealment of both a birth (or conception) 
of man, as well as creation of the world as a whole. Augustine points out that the 
concealment of both events is associated with the incommensurability of the finite 
and limited created on the one hand, and that ontologically other foundation of the 
hypostatic life and the world, which can be characterized as non-original beginning, 
as that immemorial without which one cannot have a temporal perception of the world 
and which nevertheless escapes all definitions in terms of this world. In its essence, 
since the concept of creation out of nothing excludes any causal foundation of the 
world, creation of the world and man are both contingent events with respect to which 
any question of their “earlier” or “later” has no sense.3
1 Conf. XI, 10 [ET: (Chadwick, 1991: 225)]. 
2 Civ. Dei., Book XII. 13 [ET: (Bettenson, 1980: 486–487)].
3 The analogy between the phenomenological concealment of creation of the world and of man’s birth was dis-
cussed in my article (Nesteruk, 2012: 172–205), as well as in (Nesteruk, 2015: 305–347).
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However, one must analyse further some implications of the question, discussed 
by Maximus. If the question about “when” of creation is related to the temporal span 
of the physical universe seen from within this universe then one can find parallels 
with contemporary cosmology. Formally, Maximus’ question can be translated by 
using modern cosmological language into a question about the initial conditions of the 
universe which fix its physical parameters, including its age. But physical cosmology 
cannot give an account of the initial conditions for the dynamical laws which drive 
matter and space of the universe. Correspondingly cosmology cannot provide a clear 
explanation why the age of the visible universe is about 13.7 billion years. Since we 
can speculate on the nature of the initial conditions only from within our universe by 
extrapolating backward the properties of the observable universe, the ‘knowledge’ of 
the initial conditions thus achieved does not tell us anything about these conditions, 
as if there were special trans-worldly physical laws responsible for these conditions 
as the outcomes of these laws.1 Being bounded by the universe one cannot know the 
“laws” of the initial conditions of the universe as if they could be attested from beyond 
the universe (we can only postulate them). It is in this sense that Maximus’ response 
“no” to knowledge of the “initial conditions” of the created universe (that is “Why not 
sooner or later?” exactly corresponds to “no” in knowledge of scientific cosmology of 
the initial conditions which fix the contingent facticity of the universe and its internal 
age.
Nevertheless, to explicate the sense of Maximus’s question about “when” of creation 
and his negative reaction to it, one can be reformulate this question as if the universe 
appeared out of something preexistent. This is done purely of pedagogical purposes 
by understanding that, if one treats creation out of nothing consistently, nothing can 
pre-exist it. Still, let us imagine a pre-existent space-time continuum in which our 
universe appears (in its visible form) at some of its “moment” and “location”. Then 
the question “when” of creation will have another sense, if it is addressed from the 
outside of the universe, as a particular “when” in pre-existent time. For a moment 
we skip any concern about the sense of this preexistence, that is whether it is related 
to the multiverse, or something “before” the Big Bang, or to a cycling universe of 
Penrose’s type.2 What interests us is a possibility to approach the act of creation as an 
1 A famous example of such a hypothetical law is R. Penrose’s hypothesis postulating the low gravitational en-
tropy in the beginning of the universe. See (Penrose, 2005: 726–732; 765–768). 
2 Multiverse represents a theoretical notion reminiscent to the perennial idea of plurality of worlds. In modern 
cosmology this notion has different physical and mathematical interpretations starting with the ensemble of the 
different physical universes disjoint in space and finishing by the variety of all mathematically possible worlds 
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“object”, that is as a causal transition from something “before” to that which is here and 
now. This would be typical for the natural attitude to “look at” the creation and ask a 
question on the specificity of this or that “moment” of its happening in the preexistent 
scheme of things. Certainly one could refer to Augustine’s ways of responding to such a 
question simply pointing to the fact that “before” the world was created no entities such 
as all-embracing space or time could exist. Such an Augustinian response is true in its 
philosophical essence, but it would be useful to confirm this truth through a negative 
assessment of modern models of creation with preexistent space-time. Indeed to ask 
why creation “now” but not later or before, would imply the possibility of approaching 
the creation within the anticipatory space-time concept, that is to position it as a 
“physical event”, as a particular happening in the series of causations of causations 
allegedly existing outside the universe.1
As an example of “creation” in preexistent space time there is a model of “creation” 
of matter in the universe (not space and time) from the initial state with the total energy 
of matter equal zero (imitating nothing).2 The major feature of this model is that the 
universe originates in pre-existent space and time as a result of a fluctuation in the 
physical vacuum (a physical state of matter in which the values of all observables of 
particles are zero). Geometrically the development of such a universe can be presented 
as a future light cone, whose apex is positioned arbitrarily in pre-existent space and 
time. It is exactly this arbitrariness of the “place” and “moment” of origination of 
the visible universe, which constitutes a difficulty similar to that of Maximus: it is 
impossible to specify and justify why the universe originated at a specific point of 
space and time (that is it is impossible to specify “when” of this origination): the 
spontaneous “creation” of the universe could occur anywhere and at any moment of 
pre-existent space and time. In fact, a variety of different universes could originate at 
different locations of the preexistent space-time, driving cosmology to face a serious 
problem of the mutual influence of different universes.
Correspondingly the question of “when” of “creation” not only cannot be answered, 
but, in fact, does not have any sense, for if the preexistent space-time is infinite, an 
in a platonic sense. Some physicists advocate the relevance of the theory of the multiverse to physics, some 
other claim that this notion has a philosophical standing and is not physical. (See, e.g. (Carr, 2007)).
1 This logic is, in a way, inverse with respect to what, in history of discussions on extracosmic space, was called 
“intrusion” arguments. The essence of these arguments is that is the cosmos in its entirety will decay through 
fire, there must be extra space for that conflagration. A similar argument for extraspace was historically pro-
duced by Cleomedes in his hypothesis of the possibility of the whole cosmos to be shifted. If this were to be 
possible, there must be extracosmic void. See details in (Sorabji, 1988: 125–141).
2 See (Tryon, 1998: 222–225).
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infinite time could have passed since our universe originated. But this makes the 
question of temporality of the moment of creation devoid of any meaning. 1 Similarly 
the question of a spatial location of such an origin in pre-existent space does not have 
any sense.2 There is no need to argue that this kind of model has nothing to do with 
creation out of nothing in a theological sense, for space, time, the meta-law, and the 
quantum vacuum are all assumed to be pre-existent. It is reasonable to talk about 
the temporal origination of the material universe rather than about its creation out of 
nothing.3
The beginning of the world and its created temporality can be grasped from within 
the world, so that this beginning is the constituted beginning from within the world. 
No constitution or objectivisation of this beginning is possible from beyond the world, 
because this “beyond the world” is not an “object” but rather the condition of the very 
possibility for the world to be manifested to and articulated by human beings. In this 
sense the quest for the beginning of the created universe reveals itself as a quest for the 
limits of human consciousness attempting to grasp the facticity of the world. 
What is interesting is that the refutation of models of “creation” of the universe 
in preexistent space-time leads us to further clarification of what is meant by creation 
in theology. Indeed, the logical difficulty of models with pre-existent space and time 
is connected with the inability to locate the moment of time and place in space where 
the universe originated, from outside, by transcending beyond the universe itself, into 
its imaginable preexistent “before”. One can argue about the beginning of time within 
the visible universe by extrapolating its expansion backward in time. But this will 
never allow one to claim scientifically that there either was or was not pre-existent 
1 By an analogy with the abovementioned reference to St Augustine, the universe emerging from the vacuum 
fluctuation is incommensurable with the totality of the infinite pre-existent space and time, so that its position-
ing in the infinite space time does not have any sense.
2 One can invoke a famous Aristotelian objection to existence of a void beyond the cosmos on the grounds of the 
counter arguments to Cleomedes who suggested that the whole cosmos could be shifted as a whole. According 
to Aristotle the logical difficulty would be exactly in the choice of the direction of movement: why should the 
cosmos move in this direction rather than that, and why should it stop here rather than there? (Aristotle, Physics, 
4.8, 215a1). In modern terms this can be described as if the preexistent space would be uniform: the uniformity 
makes devoid of any sense questioning the absolute position of the cosmos since all locations are equivalent, so 
that the location of he cosmos could be described in terms of “everywhere” and “nowhere”. 
3 It is interesting to note that the first ‘scientific’ ideas on the origination of the universe in pre-existent space and 
time were proposed by Newton who intended to reconcile the Biblical account of creation, where the world had 
to have a beginning, with his view that time could have neither beginning nor end. Newton asserted that the 
visible universe was brought into existence by God in the past which is separated from us by finite time, but this 
took place within the absolute and infinite space and time. The creation of matter in Newton’s model is detached 
from the creation of time. One sees here a fundamental difference not only with the contemporary views based 
on General Relativity, where space and time are relational upon matter but even with Maximus the Confessor 
for whom space and time where inseparable elements of the creaturely nature of the world (Balthasar, 2003: 
139).
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time “before” our universe came into existence. The situation was described by Kant 
in terms of his first cosmological antinomy as a logical tension between the thesis, 
that the world has a beginning in time and is also limited as regards space, and the 
antithesis, that the world has no beginning and no limits in space; it is infinite as 
regards both time and space (Kant, A 426-427/B454-455).
The abovementioned antinomy which arises in cosmology with pre-existent space 
and time can be considered from a different perspective, without any reference to 
space and time, which brings us even closer to the thought of Maximus the Confessor 
on the illegitimate interrogation about “when” of creation. For example, the thesis can 
be treated as the affirmation that the visible universe is unique and finite as regards 
space and time, whereas the antithesis is that the visible universe, being finite in terms 
of its temporal past, is one particular representative out of the ensemble of universes 
with different boundary conditions (corresponding, in the previous logic, to different 
moments of their origination in preexistent time). The plurality of different boundary 
conditions corresponds to the logical multitude of a Platonic-like kind, so that the 
antinomial nature of any predication on the uniqueness or not of these conditions 
becomes evident because the ontological status of that which is predicated in thesis 
and antithesis is different: one can make an empirical inference with respect to the 
visible universe, whereas an assumption that there is an ensemble of universes, which 
one cannot verify empirically, requires an intellectual inference, that is the reference 
to the realm of the intelligible. In this case the whole meaning of the antinomy reveals 
itself as predication about two ontologically distinct realities, that is the empirical 
visible universe and the Platonic-like ensemble of the universes. If we extrapolate this 
reasoning back to the problem, discussed by Maximus the Confessor, the question 
posed by him in the Centuries on Charity 4.3 must be transformed in such a way 
that the temporal aspect of the specificity of the creation of the world is replaced by 
the aspect of “choice” of this particular world out of many potential possible worlds, 
namely “Why did God choose to create this world but not the other?”1
It is not difficult to see that in this theological extension of the idea of pre-existent 
space and time towards an intelligible realm one abandons an ontological insight on the 
nature of appearance of the visible universe (thus removing metaphysical reasoning) 
and replaces it by an “event-like” argument, related to the Divine agency. This implied 
1 In modern cosmology such an interpretation corresponds to different models of the multiverse. It has also par-
ticular connotations with Penrose’s suggestion that the special initial conditions of our universe responsible for 
arrow of time in it, are set up from outside through choosing them out of many other possibilities, which could 
lead to different universes. See (Penrose, 2005: 726–732). 
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event has nothing to do with the causality of the world because it has the transcendent 
foundation. Correspondingly it has the sense of the inaugural event, granting the 
universe the future, but whose literal sense can only be disclosed through the movement 
of thought in the thus “chosen” universe. Certainly the imagery of the ensemble of 
the universe as they stand in front of the “mind of God” is itself a metaphor made 
in the natural attitude assuming that one can position these universes as the outside 
entities. However their status remains that of intelligible objects pressing again the 
point that these universes remain created entities and one cannot separate them from 
that subject who asserts the free choice of God in materialising the universe with those 
initial conditions which lead to the observable display of the cosmos. The appeal to 
the “choice” of the initial conditions effectively points to the freedom and wisdom of 
creation of the world with no reference to the anticipatory context of such a creation if 
the latter could be imagined. Correspondingly, for us this “choice” carries the traces 
of an event exceeding the measure of the metaphysically possible, unpredictable and 
unforeseeable. 
Since in the times of Maximus, phenomenology of events did not exist, his vision 
of the issue we are concerned with was shaped differently, but in its spirit similarly, 
by transforming the ontological question of “Why not sooner?” into the question of an 
event in the internal life of God.
The Origin of the Universe and the logoi of Creation
In Ambigua 7 Maximus states that “the logoi of all things known by God before 
their creation are securely fixed in God.… Yet all these things, things present and 
things to come, have not been brought into being contemporaneously with their being 
known by God; rather each was created in appropriate way according to its logos at 
the proper time according to the wisdom of the maker….”1 He makes a distinction 
between knowledge of things by God in their logoi and their actual coming into being. 
Knowledge of things even if they are known eternally does not imply the necessity of 
their existence as created. There is an ontological incommensurability between things 
known by God as potentially existent and those which were brought into being. If one 
applies this thought to the universe as a whole, one can suggest that the knowledge by 
God of this universe with a potential to become created does not necessarily imply its 
creation. There is a gap in the necessitation between knowledge and actual creation 
1 Ambigiua 7, PG 91, 1081A. [This ET: (Blowers, Wilken, 2003: 56–57)].
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which is based, according to Maximus, in the Divine wisdom and will and which not 
only brings all things into existence at their proper time, but ultimately brings the 
actually existing world as a whole into existence. The words of Maximus related to 
the wisdom of the Creator with regard to the “determination” of a proper moment of 
creation can be, by a matter of philosophical suggestion, applied to the “determination 
of the choice” of the world as such, or, in cosmological phraseology, the choice of the 
world with those boundary conditions which led to the actual display of the universe. 
Then the question is: “Could God know not only of this world which he has actually 
created, but other potential worlds which either have not been created at all, or have 
been created in a different mode of being?” If the answer is yes, then we must suppose 
that just as God applied his wisdom for creating this world, he must have been wise of 
not creating other worlds, or creating them in a different mode of being. This wisdom 
reveals itself through God’s will to make a choice in the actual creation of this world. 
Correspondingly all other worlds, being only potential possibilities either remained as 
such, or they were implanted in creation, for example, as intelligible entities with the 
logoi not to acquire any corporeal shape, remaining the images and prints of the divine 
wisdom accessible to an intellectual search and contemplation. In this sense the very 
idea of the variety of the “boundary” conditions for the created world manifests itself 
as a pointer, a paradeigmata, towards the detection of the divine wisdom. If our way of 
extrapolating Maximus’ thought is correct, then it relieves us from the uncertainty of 
creation related to the allegedly preexistent choice of the possible worlds with different 
boundary conditions and makes the problem of the specific temporal beginning (as 
special boundary conditions) of our universe to be transformed toward the problem 
of the special ontological distinction, or extension (diastema) between God and the 
world. This transformation allows one to look at the distinction between God and the 
universe (that is between uncreated and created) in terms of a definite structure in 
creation, namely in terms of the difference between that world which has its corporeal 
representation and those potential worlds which do not have such a representation 
remaining no more then intelligible traces of that which could be known by God, but 
not created in the corporeal form. The actual choice of creating our universe is thus a 
setting up a special difference in creation between intelligible (created non-corporeal 
worlds) and sensible (our actual world). In this case the setting of the boundary 
conditions for the actual physical universe, as a corporeal choice out of many possible 
universes, implies that these boundary conditions, or the origin of the physical universe, 
presuppose a definite structure of the intelligible realm which complements the actual 
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universe in the whole creation. In different words, the choice of the corporeal world 
out of many potential worlds means setting up the basic ontological difference (the 
basic diaphora) in creation, which thus becomes a constitutive element of creatio ex 
nihilo.1 The will and wisdom of God in creating this world with its particular immanent 
age (which is the subject of Maximus’ discussion) is thus encapsulated in the specific 
diaphora between this world and all those which are not destined to become corporeal. 
And it is this last sentence that unfolds to some extent the sense of the logos of creation 
of our universe.
Coming back to the initial stance of Maximus on creation, one could suggest that 
his ultimate objective was to provide a logical and philosophical argument that the 
world had a beginning in the sense that it is not eternal and hence incommensurable 
with God. The fact that the world’s parts are subject to temporal flux and decay is part 
of the mundane experience. The question of the temporality and decay of the world 
as a whole is much more problematic. Everything depends on how this wholeness is 
understood: if it is just an additive something comprised of the parts, then the criteria 
of the finitude and created temporality can be applied to the world as well. However 
there is a difficulty, which is well understood in modern cosmology, that one cannot 
speak about the universe as a whole as being in space and time and hence as subject 
to the same constitutional synthesis which is applied to separate physical objects. In 
this sense the universe as a whole is not in space and time and that is why it is unclear 
how one can contrapose the whole universe to the Divine eternity and what kind 
of incommensurability is implied here. The logical inconsistency of applying such 
notions as space and time to the universe as a whole, does not remove, however, the 
fact that the universe is created and its contingency requires a sufficient foundation. 
If this universe as a whole is not eternal (in terms of immanent time), then it has 
“transcendent beginning” which rather implies a logical origination, or dependence 
upon something which is absolutely necessary. Even if cosmology would pronounce 
that the world is eternal as evolving indefinitely in terms of the immanent time, this 
eternity as an endless temporal flux has a different ontological status in comparison 
with the transworldly eternity understood as absolutely necessary being.
The important conclusion from this discussion is that modern cosmology, in spite 
of all its attempts to predicate the initial state of the universe through the theories of the 
Big Bang, comes to the same conclusion that was grasped long before by the Fathers, 
1 See details in (Thunberg, 1995: 50–55).
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namely that the “original” state of the universe which symbolises its unity, identity and 
totality cannot be defined in immanent terms; it requires a founding principle which 
explicates the logos of creation of the universe, the principle which can be formulated in 
Maximus’ words as “the whole of creation admits of one and the same undiscriminated 
logos, as having not been before it is”1, or, “the divine principle which holds the entire 
creation together is that it should have non-being as the ground of its being.”2 This 
helps to give the discursive explanation of what it means to detect the presence of the 
logos of creation from within the created realm: namely to establish the understanding 
that every created object, intelligible or sensible, is theogenically uniform, that is it has 
one and the same transcendent ground of its existence in its non-existence (non-being), 
or, in different words, in its otherness. It is this theogenic uniformity which cascades, 
in cosmology, to the cosmographic uniformity.
Modern cosmology is unanimous in that the Big Bang was an event in the past 
which is extraordinary and antecedently efficacious with respect to all possible events 
that happened in the universe since then. This exceptional event, predicted theoretically 
and having some observational consequences tests the limits of the physical sciences. 
That physics which has been discovered on the planet earth in a relatively short 
historical period can be applied only up to this boundary in the past of the universe 
beyond which any scientific claim is problematic. In spite of the obvious fact that there 
is no evidence for claiming that this event can be associated with creatio ex nihilo, its 
theoretical prediction at least sheds the light on some constitutive elements of creatio 
ex nihilo, which explicate the logos of creation of the universe. We intentionally avoid 
any talk about the “explanation” of the creation of the universe out of nothing; instead 
we speak of the detection of the presence of the logos of creation, the logos of that 
originary state in the universe with respect to which human comprehension experiences 
an imminent difficulty. The detection of the presence of such a logos, being an event 
in the spiritual life of a believer cascades to the comprehension that the creation of the 
world out of nothing is a saturated phenomenon, confrontation with which indicated 
the commensurability of creation with an event of life thus making creation itself a part 
of the event of life confirming a longstanding thesis of the Christian cosmology that 
it is human history which determines the cosmic history, but not vice versa (Clément, 
1976: 80). 
1 Ambigua 41, PG 91, 1312B [This ET: (Louth, 1996: 160)].
2 (Thunberg, 1995: 401). C.f. Maximus the Confessor, Centuries on Charity 3.28: “We affirm that the divine 
substance alone has nothing contrary, since its is eternal and infinite and bestows eternity on all the rest. The 
substance of things, however, has not-being as contrary” [This ET: (Sherwood, 1955: 178)].
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“Why not sooner?” and Kantian cosmological antinomy
We have already seen that the problem “Why not sooner?” is closely connected with 
the Kantian cosmological (mathematical) antinomy about the origin of the world. The 
analysis of this antinomy confirms with an even greater force that the natural attitude 
is non applicable to the issue of creation of the world and this analysis contributes to 
the explication of creation of the world as an event. 
According to Kant, the First Antinomy is formulated, as the opposition between 
the thesis that the world had a beginning in time and is limited in space, and antithesis 
that it had no beginning in time and is unlimited in space, being infinite in its duration 
backwards and in its extent (Kant A426-427/B454-455). Kant claims that he refutes 
both thesis and antithesis, assuming that a refutation of the either would be an indirect 
proof of the opposite. For the purposes of our research we mostly concentrate on the 
refutation of the thesis, placing Kant’s way of thought in line with those objections 
to creatio ex nihilo which have been already considered and originating from the 
argument “why not sooner?”
If the world had a beginning this would imply the existence of “empty” time before 
the world began. Then he argues, similarly to Augustine and Leibniz, that there is 
nothing in any moment of “empty” time to determine why the world had begun at that 
moment rather that at any other. Correspondingly, referring to the Leibniz’s Principle 
of Sufficient Reason and pointing that there were not sufficient reason for the world to 
begin at one or another moment of “empty” time, it cannot begin at any moment of this 
time and hence it never began. Seen from the perspective of the present, this refutation 
of the thesis can be compared with the argument “why not sooner?”: indeed, the inability 
to position the beginning of the world in pre-existent “empty” time is equivalent to the 
question as to why the world has begun at certain moment in the past, but not sooner 
(or later) with respect to the present. The refutation of Kant’s thesis has as a premise the 
idea of absolute space as it was promoted by Newton. Correspondingly the refutation 
of the thesis proposed by Kant implies first the acceptance of the Newtonian vision 
of space. This means that if the Newtonian substantive representation of space and 
time is not shared by some philosophers, like Leibniz, for example, the whole power 
of the refutation immediately collapses by saying that the initial idea of empty time is 
inadequate. One notices here a certain reference to the previously discussed arguments 
of Basil the Great and Augustine that no time was in existence before the world has 
begun. Similarly, if according to Leibniz’s model of relational space there must have 
been an inaugural event of relation between things in the world which gave rise to space 
– 1620 –
Alexei V. Nesteruk, Tatiana V. Litvin. The Phenomenological Interpretation of Creation of the World out of Nothing…
and time, then the problem of the beginning of time can be reformulated as existence of 
an inaugural event such that it was followed by other events but was not preceded by 
any other events. The inaugural event would not mean an event in an ordinary sense as 
if it happened in the background of the already existent time. This event would be the 
generating state of affairs from which all consequent events (or instants of time) unfold. 
In this case the parlance of empty time “before” this first event would loose its sense 
and the whole acuteness of Kant’s thesis would transform into the question of the first 
(inaugural) event. In other words, the assertion of the thesis on the beginning of the 
world in time would transform into the assertion of the first event and the issue would 
become as to “Why did the particular event with no antecedent causation took place?”, 
or “Why such an event does not have predecessors at all?”, or “Why such an event 
happened in order to launch the coming of the world into existence?” Since Kant does 
no appeal, in a style of the Church Fathers to the argument of God’s will, wisdom and 
love, he does not consider his refutation of the thesis as a possible objection to creatio 
ex nihilo. He remains in a philosophical frame of mind and in many ways is concerned 
with the explication of the difficulties of the human mind in tackling the questions about 
infinity and ultimate reality. However, seen through a theologically committed insight, 
one understands that the limits of the understanding originate in the conditions after 
the Fall, resembling the moral tensions in representation of things seen as objects or as 
events. It is in this perspective one can look at Kant’s antinomy as a vivid explication 
of the tension in representing the world in the phenomenality of objects or events. If his 
appeal to empty time effectively positions the world as and object in pre-existent space 
and time of a Newtonian kind – we have a problem of understanding the beginning 
of the world. If, on the other hand the same thesis is understood as a statement on the 
inaugural first event, then one understands that the refutation of Kant does not have 
sense, for the inaugural event enters human consciousness as a saturated phenomenon 
whose constitution within the transcendental limits is not possible. Hence its refutation 
is impossible. Correspondingly the very sense of the antinomy changes: it just says 
that one cannot deal with the beginning of the world (or its spatial boundaries) in the 
natural attitude. 
If in a historical approach to the question of the beginning of the world as (“Why 
not sooner?”) the main focus was on the positioning of the inaugural event associated 
with the creation in the finite past and enquiring about the contingent measure of 
the temporal span to this event from the present, in Kant’s perception this issue is 
interpreted “outwardly” by positioning the inaugural event as an “ordinary” happening 
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in the background of the pre- existing “empty time” which, by construction is not 
subject to any limiting definition and thus is infinite in a vague sense. What happens 
here is that the very beginning of the world is considered as part of the logic in which 
the world pre-exists this event. Hence the issue of its arbitrariness emerges. However 
in its essence the event of the beginning of the world cannot be by its nature described 
as a mundane happening in pre-existing time. Correspondingly any attempt to assign 
to it any temporal setting in terms of its own beyond and in the quality of either infinite 
or finite time does not have sense. What happens in Kant’s refutation of the thesis of 
the antinomy is that the question of the inaugural event is not distinguished from the 
question of the infinite or finite duration of the world. In other words, it is not clarified 
carefully whether the implied temporality is related to the world which has already 
emerged from the inaugural event or this temporality has a general property of being 
independent of the fact of the existence of this world. 
If there was a first event in the world’s history, then the duration of that history 
backwards from any assigned instant in it, for example the present, is finite. This is 
true in the case if this first event can be identified as that one which did not have 
predecessors. However the sense of the finitude of the past can be established only if 
a definite scale of time is accepted such that the first event would imply the absolute 
beginning of this very scale assuming that the passage of time to this beginning is 
qualitatively similar to the passage of time perceived as its linear flow. If, however, 
the scale of time in order to approach its beginning is different and is based on a 
different type of the limiting procedure, the very definition of the inaugural event as 
the first event becomes problematic. In this case the temporal finitude of the world 
is not incompatible with the inability to pin down the first event. Conversely, if the 
same alternative scale of the passage of time involves an infinite number of steps to 
accomplish it whilst remaining in the finite limits of the linear perception of time, one 
still can talk about not the first event of counting time through the infinite number 
of steps, but about the inaugural event of the very “beginning” of the count of time 
not in a pre-existing temporal sense, but as emerging logically as a philosophically 
understood event escaping the causality and any categorical predetermination.
In order to illustrate the last thought one can consider, as an example, the sequence 
of rational fractions of the type P/Q (where P and Q interges) ascending in the order 
of magnitude, let us say, to the value of 1. Let us associate this sequence with the 
passage of time from allegedly existing beginning at t=0 (corresponding to the lim 
Pn/Qn  0) to the present which is symbolized by P/Q =1. Such a sequence {Pn/Qn}, 
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whose concluding term is 1, does have no first term as Qn  ∞ discretely reaching it 
only asymptotically, so that the smallest fraction effectively does not exist. However 
one can definitely say that the segment (0,1] is of finite length. This is tantamount to 
the position of the world in some pre-existing entity which implies the transcendence 
of the world (as an exit from the rational sequence to the real) and thus positioning the 
whole sequence of counts within the segment as an object. According to this analogy 
the world history had no first term and yet the duration backwards from the present is 
finite. In respect to Kant’s antinomies this example, although it can be taken only as an 
analogy, shows that the duration of the world backwards in time can be understood by 
two different means. The first one is a view that the world’s age can be calculated only 
from within counting the sequence of time towards the past discretely by a sort of a 
limiting procedure. Then its duration is infinite because of the infinite number of terms 
in the temporal sequence or infinite numbers of steps in order to perform this sequence 
through computation. In this case the infinitude of the temporal passage of time is 
associated with its effective non-computability: in order to explicate the beginning of 
time one implies an infinite computational synthesis which is not available to the finite 
human being. However, if one models the temporality of the world on the grounds of 
the laws of physics by extrapolating them backwards in time as a formal parameter 
in the continuous differential equations, the age of the world (corresponding in our 
example to the segment (0,1]) could be finite, so that the “zero” (0) can be treated as 
the first or inaugural event. One sees in these two cases in the representation of the 
beginning of the world an interesting overlapping of the issue of the inaugural event 
and the temporal finitude/infinitude of the world. If the approach to the modelling 
of the past implies the infinite number of computations, the world is infinitely old in 
the sense of non-computability, that is inexplicability in finite time. Correspondingly 
one cannot talk of the first event transferring the sense of the inaugural eventness of 
the world towards the inaugural eventness of the very process of computation. If the 
approach to the modelling of the past of the world is based on a finite computation of 
solutions of continuous differential equations, one comes to the explicit notion of the 
first instant of the physical world and this manifests the end of the method of physics 
as applicable to the world, thus explicating the finite nature of humanity who created 
this physics. The difference between these two approaches can be understood as if 
the opposite procedures in calculation of time sequences applied either exceptionally 
to the world as it is seen from within (the sequence of rational fractions which cannot 
be transcended into the realm of real numbers), or from the perspective of temporality 
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transcending the limits of it sequential representation and thus having an abstract, 
intelligible sense. But in this case the inaugural event of the world turns out to be 
inextricably linked to the inaugural event of consciousness asserting such an event. 
Having no experience of one’s own absolute beginning human beings struggle with 
defining such beginnings in the world.1
One can rearticulate the sense of what is implied in the question “Why did the 
world begin when it did?” (as a variation of the question “Why not sooner?”) by 
making a clear distinction whether this question is posed from within an external or 
internal perspective. If this question is asked as if the world is considered within the 
process or series of events in it, then the implied question on the time at which this 
process began implicitly relates this process to some external temporal framework 
in relation to which the question of the beginning has sense. It is also implied here 
another dimension of the same question as related to the condition (external) for this 
worldly process to begin. However it is exactly the positioning of the world in external 
time or conditioning it that is impossible because, in coherence with longstanding 
theological arguments, there were no external relation to anything before the world. 
Unlike historical events that could have some preconditions for their happening, the 
world as a whole has nothing external to its history and hence its beginning. As was 
emphasised by Strawson, the supposition that it might have begun at some other time is 
as empty of meaning as the supposition that its external temporal relations might have 
been different (Strawson, 2006: 179). Correspondingly there cannot be any explanation 
as to “Why did the world begin when it did?” and not at some other time. However 
Strawson himself makes an attempt to elucidate the question concerned by modifying 
the sense of interrogation of the arbitrariness of the beginning of the world invoking 
the notion of the present now. Indeed, it is by attempting to conceive the history of the 
world as differently positioned in time, shifted either backwards or forwards, what is 
tacitly supposed is that all temporal relations in the world remain intact and the identity 
of the present moment remains independent of how time was filled in with historical 
events. In this sense the very shift of the whole sequence of the world events does not 
have any sense since it does not change anything in perception of the now.
1 This was emphatically expressed in the beginning of the 20th century by Gabriel Marcel: “I cannot really stand 
aside from the universe, even in thought. Only by a meaningless pretence can I place myself at some vague 
point outside it, and from thence reproduce on a small scale the successive stages of its genesis. Nor can I 
place myself outside myself… and question myself upon my own genesis. I mean of course the genesis of my 
non-empirical, or metaphysical reality. The problem of the genesis of the I and of the genesis of the universe 
are just one and the same problem, or, more exactly, one and the same insoluble, the insolubility being bound 
up with my very position, my existence, and the radical metaphysical fact of that existence” (Marcel, 1965: 15).
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The question “Why did the world begin when it did?” can acquire a different sense 
if it refers to the internal nature of the world processes. In response to Strawson’s 
claim that he does not know how this can be shown, and to his appeal for physicists 
to construe and answer this question as an internal question, modern cosmology can 
clarify some points. For example, the age of the universe is claimed to be between 13 
and 14 billion years and one could ask the question, for example, why the universe 
needed so long to exist? Why its age is not, let say 13 or 14 millions (instead of billions) 
years? In this case cosmology gives quite an impressive justification that the universe 
must be older than 10 billion years in order the carbon-based life in the universe 
could develop and the human interrogation of the age of the world would be possible.1 
However in this case the initial question on “Why did the world begin when it did?” 
has nothing to do with the allegedly existing or not empty (Absolute) space and time. 
Cosmology in this sense manifests itself as the science of immanence with no recourse 
to transcending the world. It has to accept that the age of the world is related to the 
initial conditions of this universe which, as such, are not controlled by the immanent 
physics. Certainly here is a teleological solution of the problem is possible relating the 
age of the universe to the necessary conditions for existence of the human intelligence. 
But in any case the asking of the question “Why did the world begin when it did?” 
implying a sort of external, transcendent, framework for the world is devoid of sense, 
for either theologically there is nothing beyond the world in terms of time and space, 
or, if one attempts to position the world “within eternity and infinity”, there is no sense 
of asking “when” and “where” within them. 
If, from what we have discussed, the external perspective for the question “Why 
did the world begin when it did?” does not have any sense, the internal perspective, in 
view of modern cosmology, reduces to the issue of initial conditions of the universe (in 
technical physical terms) or, more generally, to the problem of the inaugural event. The 
status of this event becomes a major concern of modern cosmology to the same extent 
as it was at the heart of the First antinomy: “The question of finite or infinite duration 
backwards from the present seem to be of interest only in so far as an answer to it 
carries with it one or other of the alternatives, a first event or no first event”.2 
The thesis of Kant’s antinomy contains a part related to spatial extension of the 
world: if the world is finite in time and had a beginning, its spatial span is also finite. 
1 This what is known as the Anthropic Principle in cosmology, stating a fgine-tuned connection between the 
necessary conditions of the human existence and large-scale parameters of the universe. See, in this respect 
(Barow, Tipler, 1988: 18). 
2 This was the assertion of (Broad, 1954–1955: 9). 
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Kant’s refutation of this thesis begins in the same way as he was refuting the thesis 
about time. If the spatial extension of the world is finite, this world must be situated 
somewhere within an unlimited empty space. It is reasonable to suggest that empty 
space implies here a sort of pre-existed reality, Absolute Space of a Newtonian kind, 
for example. Here Kant could potentially build his further argument by invoking the 
same move as he used with respect to the refusal of the beginning of time, namely that 
the position of the world in empty space cannot be fixed by any means, that is there 
is no sufficient reason for why the world could not be in another region of absolute 
space rather than to be where it is. In other words, if the world, if it exists, could be 
presented in the phenomenality of objects, it could be positioned in any part of the 
underlying absolute space and one cannot give any reason for a particular choice. One 
sees that this possible move would be similar to asking on the position of the beginning 
of the world on the scale of pre-existing time in the context of the question “Why not 
sooner?” related to the creation of the world in the inaugural event. 
However, Kant invokes here a different argument which will allow us to reinterpret 
the question of “Why not sooner?” in a completely new perspective. According to him 
there must be a certain relation between the world as a whole and empty space in which 
this world is “situated”. Kant describes this possible relation as a relation to nothing, 
concluding that there is no relation at all and thus the world cannot be limited in spatial 
extension. However his identification of empty space (or Absolute Space) with nothing 
must be clarified. Kant’s identifying empty space with nothing can have sense only if 
he believes that empty space cannot be described in terms of those rubrics of thought 
which pertain to the world. In this case the very initial positioning of the finite world 
within nothing does not have any sense. If, on the contrary, empty space (Absolute 
Space) allows its presentation in abstraction, its relation to the world would not be 
a relation of nothing to something. One could agree that Absolute Space cannot be 
described as a thing, so that no relation is possible with respect to it as the relation of 
something (like the world) to another thing (which Absolute Space is not). In both cases 
it seems that what Kant tacitly implies in his invocation of nothing as a different name 
of Absolute Space is that the latter represents a non-material existent, that is a sort of 
intelligible entity whose ontological status is fundamentally different in comparison 
with that one of the world. This can be confirmed by Kant himself when he reaffirms 
that space is merely the form of outer intuition and that it is not a real object which can 
be outwardly intuited. “Space, ….is, under the name of absolute space, nothing but 
the mere possibility of outer appearances…” (Kant, footnote b to B457: 398). In this 
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case the very attempt to construct the relation between the world and Absolute Space 
understood in a non-material sense is a failure from the beginning since it attempts to 
bring into correlation two ontologically disconnected realms. Then the question of the 
arbitrary “position” of the world as a whole within Absolute Space, which is tantamount 
to the assertion that this Absolute Space is either geometrically (if it is thought as 
Euclidian space) or intelligibly uniform, becomes also a question of a definite size of 
the world which could be formulated similarly to that one on time: “Why not bigger 
or smaller?” This question is similar to the question about the contingent position of 
the world in Absolute Space for the size of the world cannot be measured in relation 
to the infinite absolute space and it can have, according to the fourth axiom of Euclid, 
any spatial measure. Certainly the question about the contingency of the world’s size 
and its position in pre-existing Absolute Space has sense only if this Absolute Space is 
treated to be infinite in the sense of indefinite. When Kant appeals to it as the form of 
outer intuition, the infinity is implied as quantitatively indeterminant. In other words, 
if Absolute Space is treated as non-material “entity”, being for example an intuitive 
form of the empirically impossible successive synthesis of the overall space of the 
universe, it deprives the thesis of Kant’s antinomy of any ontological meaning and 
reasonability by converting thus into the statement of contingency of the world and 
impossibility of finding of any underlying cause for its facticity. If Absolute Space is 
treated as a form of outer intuition, then the very positioning of the world as a whole 
“inside” this form in the thesis of the antinomy is tantamount to representing the world 
as a whole as a finite object. Then the refutation of the thesis can be treated as the 
overcoming of the tension between the sense of the world as an event in the function 
of consciousness of Absolute Space on the one hand, and the sense of the world as 
an object in Absolute Space (that which is posited by consciousness as ontologically 
uniform with the world). The net result of the analysis of Kant’s first antinomy is that 
the very intuition of the pre-existing space and time has strictly intelligible nature. 
Neither pre-existing time or space can be assigned an ontological status similar to that 
of the world. Correspondingly the positioning of the world in the background of pre-
existing conditions has only a propedeutic sense by disguising the perennial questions 
about contingent facticity of the world in terms of its age and its size. 
All arguments on the dubious nature of positioning the world in Absolute Space 
can easily be applied to the positioning of the universe in “empty time”, or eternity. 
In analogy with a spatial aspects of the world and Absolute Space any positioning of 
the world within eternity is an illusion of positioning the empirical world “within” 
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the intelligible eternity. Once again we observe an inherent dualism present behind 
all Kantian arguments for explicating antinomies, namely the dualism between the 
sensible and intelligible. However Kant’s position is not prone to a Platonic dualism, 
ontologizing the realm of the Absolute Space or eternity. His argument ultimately comes 
from his transcendental idealism portraying space and time as forms of sensibility 
with no ontological correlates. If things in space and time are only appearances, 
neither spatial nor temporal series which are presented in antinomies exist either as a 
limited or as an infinite totality as if these totalities could acquire the phenomenality of 
objects. In this sense the antinomies vindicate the thesis of transcendental idealism that 
contains the solution of the apparent conflict of reason with itself simply because they 
demonstrate exactly that the world as a whole cannot be subjected to the description in 
terms of quality, quantity, relation and modality, that is to be an/the object. Strawson 
gave three possible interpretations of Kant’s solution to the problem of antinomies, 
each corresponding to a different version of transcendental idealism. All these versions 
contribute in a way to our stance on the impossibility of representation of the universe 
as a whole in the phenomenality of objects (Strawson, 2006: 187–197). However we 
want to dwell on one of his version, which, in the context of the question “Why not 
sooner?” brings us closer to that understanding of this problem as it was anticipated by 
St. Augustine. 
If one takes a strong stance on transcendental idealism that nothing exists but 
temporally ordered perceptions, representations, experiences and inner determinations 
of the mind, and that the latter are attained in “themselves”, it is reasonable to raise 
a question analogous to that considered in the first antinomy regarded the previous 
history of the allegedly existing world. Namely, whether the series of perceptions 
(inner determinations) has a beginning or stretches infinitely backward in time. It is 
evident that the question from the antinomy was not exactly about this. It concerned 
with the previous phases of the history of the universe in general, but not that particular 
subclass of events in this history , that is series of conscious experience of human 
beings. Correspondingly, if the beginning of the universe is portrayed through the series 
of perceptions of conscious beings, can one claim that somehow the representation of 
the beginning of the world correlates with the beginning of the series of perception? 
The response to the issue of the beginning of the world could be based on the reference 
considered above that one cannot ground any response in something which could not 
ever complete a survey of the universe as a whole in space and in time. This conclusion 
is based on the assumption that the conscious being is still capable of inferring either 
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to the finitude or infinity of the world regardless of the a-priori unclarified structure 
of the very subjectivity which make enquiry into such a matter. This argument, in a 
way similar to that which we advocate by insisting that the universe (not saying at all 
of Absolute Space and eternity), or the world as a whole, cannot be presented in the 
phenomenality of objects.
Creation out of nothing in the phenomenality of events 
The phenomenological refutation of the question “Why not sooner?” with respect 
to creation out of nothing leads us to the conclusion that neither the very act of 
creation or the created world as such can be subjected to relational analysis because 
it is unique and one cannot rerun the universe or stage it as an experimental event. 
Creation, or the universe as a whole is identical only to itself, so that its unfolding 
facticity is characterised not only by irreproducibility but by irreversibility understood 
not in a technical, thermodynamic sense, but as a logical irreversibility, as coming 
into the facticity of existence and the impossibility of exiting this existence. Creation 
makes itself a phenomenon not arising from our initiative and not responding to our 
expectations (since it cannot be reproduced). It gives itself to us from its own self to 
such an extent that it affects us, changes us and almost constitutes us, and stages us out 
of its own giving itself to us: hence it has a phenomenality of an event.1 
The observation that creation (the universe as a whole) cannot be foreseen on 
the grounds of any causation, can be rephrased as that the universe imposes itself on 
perception without one being able to assign to it a substance in which it dwells as an 
accident (or a cause from which it results as an effect: there is no causal principle of 
the world). One could refer to the invisible whole of the universe as that substance 
“in” which the observable part of the universe (as its accident) dwells. The universe is 
given to us in its pieces and moments which represent that whole which will never be 
accessible per se. The invocation of the idea of the primordial substance in this context 
would just mean a conviction that there is an undifferentiated unity of “all in all”, and 
the visible universe represents its particular realization of the demiurgic order out of 
chaos in the ancient sense. This mental split in the representation of the universe as 
substance and accident does not correspond however to the immediate experience of 
the universe as an event of life for it is in this event that it is exactly impossible to make 
a distinction between “substance” of life and life as an “accident”. Correspondingly 
1 More detailed description of the phenomenality of events can be found in (Marion, 2010: 244–308); see also 
(Romano, 1998; 2010).
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it is problematic to look for the cause of the universe (as the effect of this cause) if it 
is perceived as coaevus universo, that is the universe as “simultaneous” with one’s 
life. The question of the facticity of the universe (as an effect of some cause) cannot 
be even addressed if the universe is seen as the totality of all. All rhetoric about the 
origination of the universe in the Big Bang has no philosophical significance as the 
“cause” of the universe, because it does not address the issue of the “cause” of the Big 
Bang itself. One can suggest that another typical characteristic of the universe as an 
event amounts to the fact that the number of “possible explanations” of its facticity is 
indefinite and increases in proportion to cosmological hermeneutics that cosmologists 
and their interpreters produce. 
The treatment of the universe in the phenomenality of events does not deny its 
temporality. The temporality of the universe as a whole cannot be that of the physical 
flow in pre-existing time, it is a different temporality of events which must be elucidated. 
In order to do this let us start from a simple question: if the phenomenon of the universe 
giving itself in a mode of an event carries the signs of temporality, does it reaffirm the 
Kantian position that every phenomenon is a phenomenon if it admits a representation 
as experience in time-form of sensibility? The response to this is that while in Kant’s 
view temporality serves only to allow the synthesis of phenomena as object with a 
certain identity, that is a guarantee of its permanence in presence justified through 
assigning it a cause or a reason, the event-like character of the universe as a whole 
cannot rely on this kind of a synthesis and thus permits a corresponding phenomenality 
of the universe contrary to the objectivity established in physical cosmology. The 
objectiveness of the created universe as permanence in presence through its evolution 
becomes a projection or even an illusion of an a-temporal event. The universe being 
described by mathematical laws as an evolving object entails that its notion is emptied 
of any intuitive content and thus represents a shadow of that event which gives itself in 
the fact of life. But then there is a question of the internal sense of temporality of life 
itself. Indeed, temporality belongs to sensibility of subjects articulating the universe 
and orienting them towards the synthesis of the already given objects. However it is 
this same temporality that is never applied in order to constitute and define the acting 
agent of this synthesis, that is the transcendental “I”. Then, if one conjectures that the 
phenomena temporalized as objects (the evolving universe) preserve a trace of their 
belonging to the event (an intuition of the universe as a whole), still the transcendental 
“I” does not phenomenalize itself as an event. This happens because the “I” never 
phenomenalises itself at all: it does not appear among other phenomena, that is it 
– 1630 –
Alexei V. Nesteruk, Tatiana V. Litvin. The Phenomenological Interpretation of Creation of the World out of Nothing…
is excluded from that phenomenality which it produces. In this sense the idea that 
the universe as a whole is an event seems to be counter-intuitive: indeed even if the 
“I” experiences their communion with the universe through the a-temporal, that is 
non-temporalizable sense of belonging and consubstantiality, any attempt to express 
this linguistically and discursively puts the event-like sense of communion under the 
rubrics of eidetic temporality. There is one particular aspect in the phenomenality of the 
universe which employs such an eidetic temporality, namely the universe’s “beginning”, 
its point of origination, the Big Bang. It is here that the universe is explicitly eidetically 
temporalized as an event. And this happens not accidentally, but because of a deep 
analogy between the Big Bang (as a shorthand notation for the temporal boundary of 
the universe) and an event of birth of any particular “I” which is the ultimate beginning 
and end of all possible predications of life as well as the universe. It is here that the “I” 
phenomenalises the universe as an event on the same grounds as it phenomenolizes 
itself as its own event of birth. 
The origin of the universe which contains human beings appears in fact as a privileged 
phenomenon since a significant effort of humanity is devoted to its reconstitution as 
restoration of the lost memory of it, to giving it sense and even in a way responding to 
its appeal to us as if the universe had its distinctive self-identity. Still, humanity cannot 
see this undeniable and unavoidable phenomenon directly. The fact that one cannot see 
the origin of the universe directly and that nevertheless it reveals itself as a phenomenon 
for which cosmology constantly intends, constitutes an aporia which can be formulated 
in the following way: the origin of the universe shows to humanity precisely that its 
origin cannot be shown. This aporia urges a philosophising cosmologists to understand 
how the phenomenon of the origin of the universe that does not show itself directly 
not only affects humanity as if it did show itself, but, in fact, affects humanity in 
a more radical way than any other phenomena, since the beginning of the universe 
forms the necessary conditions for humanity’s emergence in the universe. The same 
cosmologists have to admit that since this indemonstrable origin of the universe reveals 
itself to them, it “happens” to them in that it endows human beings with a future. The 
origin of the universe can be called a phenomenon because of its presence in absence, 
that is the poverty of demonstrability, so that it comes to pass in human life as an 
event, which was never present in presence, and is always already gone past, whereas 
it never surpasses the present and, in fact, is always to come. Thus one can say that the 
origin of the universe phenomenalises itself but as a pure event unpredictable (there 
is no sense of temporality before and outside the universe), irreproducible (one cannot 
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rerun the universe), exceeding all cause (there is no physical causation from beyond 
the universe) and making the impossible possible (the probability of origination of 
our universe in multiverse scenarios is always infinitely small, that is the universe is 
a-priori impossible), surpassing all expectations and predictions (the constant advance 
of knowledge of the universe does not make it possible to assign to the universe some 
definitive and stable features which could sustain indefinitely the observational tests 
as well as an epistemological advance). Speaking of the origin of the universe we 
speak of its donation: it is given to us in the measure as it gives itself and its givenness 
to us is an apodictic fact-event which is alone responsible for that which we call the 
constituted phenomenon of the origin of the universe, or the universe as a whole. It is 
this givenness that initiates an encapsulated temporality of the universe as an event, 
which being projected onto the object-like temporality manifests the features of a 
shadow of the universe’s wholeness and its non-originary origin.
By reiterating, the universe acquires the character of an event, that is a phenomenon 
that is unforeseeable on the basis of the past, incomprehensible on the basis of the 
present and irreproducible on the basis of the future. Cosmology attempts to reconstruct 
the invisible past of the universe on the basis of its present. In this sense the past 
of the universe is not “the past in the past” but rather “the past of the present”, so 
that the unforeseeable future is simply a result of the fact that we do not know the 
past. However, neither is the universe exhaustively comprehensible on the basis of the 
present: the contingency of our location in space and time, as well as the contingency 
of the very factual self-articulation of the universe through the human voice, point 
towards the incommensurability (not consubstantiality) of the universe as a whole with 
its particular articulated incarnation leading to the untestability of many conjectures 
about the universe and the fundamental uncertainty of cosmology (See, e.g., (Ellis, 
2007: 1220)). The universe is an event because it is not reproducible on the basis of 
the future: there is simply no future with respect to the universe as a whole which by 
definition incorporates all past, present and future. Finally one asserts that the universe, 
by definition, is a unique occurrence, it is that which has a modality of absoluteness. 
All cosmological theories which attempt to explore the possibility of non-uniqueness of 
this universe1 make a reduction of the phenomenality of this universe to that distorted 
and damaged phenomenality which is typical of objects constituted by the empirical 
sciences, the phenomenality which is poor in intuition (foreseeable as reconstructed 
1 See on the multiverse hypothesis (Carr, 2007).
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from the allegedly existing past, exhaustively knowable according to existing theories, 
reproducible theoretically through the plurality of different scenarios). It is clear that 
what is left behind these reconstructions is a historical dimension of the universe as 
a unique and contingent event which cannot be exhausted by its reduction to human 
subjectivity, in particular to that mode which deals with the universe’s thematization 
as an object. Here the historicity of the universe is understood not as a sequence of its 
stages of evolution as they are described in cosmology. One implies the historicity of 
the universe as a whole as its contingent givenness to humanity in its entire span of 
time and space, that is as a humanly historical relation and communion. This historicity 
has a different origin, following not from physical causality but rather originating in 
intentional consciousness as the intrinsic and mysterious unity of subject and object, 
being and non-being, spirit and matter. 
Conclusion
By using historical examples of the Christian Patristics and Kant’s transcendental 
philosophy we have demonstrated that any philosophical approach to the issue of 
origin of the world made in the natural attitude is unsustainable. This entailed that the 
representation of the origin of the universe in the phenomenality of object fails. Then it 
was suggested that all historical examples pointed towards placing the issue of origin 
of the universe within the modern phenomenological discourse of phenomenality of 
events as unpredictable and irreproducible happening, exceeding all cause and making 
the impossible possible, surpassing all expectations and predictions. 
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В статье рассматривается одна из вечных проблем философии о причинном принци-
пе мира, в частности, проблема его сотворения так, как она понимается в христи-
анском богословии. Развивается мысль о том, что представление сотворения мира 
невозможно в естественной установке сознания, т. е. в феноменальности объектов. 
Поскольку описание сотворения выходит за рамки классической метафизики, есте-
ственно предположить, что оно может быть описано в феноменальности событий. 
Мы демонстрируем это, рассматривая примеры из патристики в контексте возра-
жений воззрению о сотворении мира из ничего, основанном на аргументе, получив-
шем в истории название «Почему не раньше?» Показано, что Отцы Церкви предви-
дели невозможность трактовки сотворения в феноменальности объектов и неявно 
трактовали сотворение как насыщенный феномен, феноменальность которого носит 
событийный характер. Далее производится анализ первой космологической антино-
мии Канта с целью получить еще одно свидетельство в пользу того, что начало мира 
не может быть интерпретировано в феноменальности объектов. В заключительной 
части нами сформулирован тезис, что Вселенная в целом, как и ее основание (начало), 
могут быть поняты только как непредсказуемое и невоспроизводимое событие, вы-
ходящее за рамки причинности и манифестирующее возможность невозможного.
Ключевые слова: богословие, космология, сотворение, христианство, событие, онто-
логия, феноменальность, философия, время.
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